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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J. R. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH
BAGNALL, and FLORENCE BAGNALL,

)

Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.

Case No. 13,753

SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an
Idaho corporation, et al.,
'-.

Defendants and
Counter-Appellants.
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL

Appellants, Suburbia Land Company, et al., seek a rehearing
of the decision rendered by this Court on October 31, 1975,
wherein this Court affirmed the decision of the trial court which
granted judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants
forfeiting the real estate agreement and quieting title in the
plaintiffs, except for an undivided one-half interest in 140.15
acres, which the Court, by Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet
Title awarded to the defendant, United Paint and Color.

Plain-

tiffs1 appeal from the Summary Judgment is presently pending
before this Court.
POINT I
LONG STANDING PRECEDENT AND SOUND POLICY DICTATE THAT A REHEARING SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF REARGUING THE.
SAME QUESTIONS THAT WERE BRIEFED AND ARGUED ON APPEAL.
It is a well settled rule that a rehearing under Rule 76(e) (1),
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Utah Rules ofDigitized
Civil
Procedure,
should not be granted merely for
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

purposes of rearguing matters that already have been briefed and
argued to the Court.

Such a policy was clearly enunciated by

this Court as early as 1886 in Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah 483, 11
P. 618, and Jones v. House, 4 Utah 484, 11 P. 619.

The reasons

for this rule are clearly set forth in Cummings v. Nielson, 42
Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912) at 624, wherein the Court states:
In this case nothing was done or attempted by
counsel, except to reargue the very propositions we had fully considered and decided. If
we should write opinions on all the petitions
for rehearing filed, we would have to devote a
very large portion of our time in answering
counsel's contentions a second time; and, if
we should grant rehearings because they are
demanded, we should do nothing else save to
write and rewrite opinions in a few cases.
All litigation must have an end.

Unless there is obvious error,

and not merely a petitioner's disagreement or disatisfaction with
the Court's opinion, rehearings are not to be granted.

Virtually

all of the courts in this country strictly follow such a rule.
See, e.g., Climate Control, Inc. v. Hill, 87 Ariz. 201, 349 P.2d
771 (1960); Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Ludwig, 158 Kan. 275,.
146 P.2d 656 (1944); Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81,
227 P.2d 365 (1950).

See also 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error, §988.

Appellants' raise six factual questions in Point III of their
petition, claiming that these six issues "are basically matters
of law applied to uncontroverted fact."

The writer will not

attack each of these issues in this brief, for this has already
been done in Points I-VI of respondents' appellate brief.

Suffice

it to say that the petitioners' contention that these six points
are questions of "lav; as applied to uncontroverted fact" is
totally without merit.

All six propositions are grounded almost.

entirely in factual
questions
disputed by all
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Lawthat
Library, J.are
Reuben heatedly
Clark Law School, BYU.
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sides.

These disputations of fact have already been fully briefed

and argued to this Court; the total number of pages in the briefs
of both sides covering these six propositions is in excess of
seventy pages.

Petitioners1 bring forth no controlling case law

heretofore overlooked, nor any newly discovered evidence not
available until the present; they simply are asking the court to
indulge them in a reargument of their previously asserted contentions.

Such is not grounds for a rehearing.

Point IV of petitioners1 brief, while a matter of procedure
and not a question of fact, has also been fully briefed and
argued by both sides, and nothing new has been offered for the
consideration of this court.

Point IV of appellants1 petition,

like their Point III discussed above, is merely a request to
reargue a question that the court has already heard and passed
upon.
Petitioners1 contentions, in Points I and II of their brief,
that the Court did not carefully consider the state of the record
on appeal and the resulting unreferenced self-serving statements,
is completely without substance.

The appellants1 chose to selec-

tively designate only those portions of the trial transcript and
exhibits which were favorable to their position on appeal.

The

sorry state of the record, and the unreferenced self-serving
statements, were closely scrutinized by the Court, and became the
basis of the Courts written de cision.

The Court, in its opinion,

stated:
As a result we have before us briefs of
both sides loaded with unreferenced, self-serving statements of facts and contentions, with
an apparent invitation that we perform their
procedural obligations and conduct their research. We cannot indulge them such luxury
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

under the circumstances here. This court,
therefore, under elementary principles anent
appellate review, in this particular case will
presume the findings of the court to have
been supported by admissible, competent, substantial evidence - to any cirticism of which,
by any litigants, the court feels constrained
to turn a deafened ear.
Respondents' appellate brief includes several pages showing
which relevant and necessary parts of the record were selectively
ignored by the appellants, including the direct and re-direct
examination of J. R. Bagnall, the direct examination of Don V.
Tibbs and all of the cross-examination of Reed R. Maxfield.

(See

respondents' brief Point X for further elaboration on this point).
But this is not the time nor the place to reargue these points,
as this was fully done on appeal; and the serious consideration
which the Court gave to these arguments, as evidenced by the
above quotation from its opinion, precludes the necessity of
rearguing the same points once again.
Appellants' brief and petition for rehearing is merely a reargument of the propositions breifed and argued on appeal, and,
therefore, the petition should be denied.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN BASING ITS DECISION ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE, COMPETENT AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The appellants1 failure to designate all relevant and necessary parts of the record further resulted in the Court's decision
to "presume the findings of the [trial] court to have been
supported by admissible, competent, substantial evidence. . . ."
Appellents1 burden on appeal was to show that the findings and
conclusions of the trial court were in error.

Since the actions

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,- may
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of the trial court are clothed with a presumption of validity,
an appellate court should reverse the decision of the trial court
only if the evidence clearly perponderates against the trial
court's findings and judgment.
To sustain the burden of showing that the trial court's
decision was in error, appellants are required to bring all the
evidence relating to issues on appeal before the court, thus
allowing the court to determine the weight and validity of the
evidence presented at trial.

This Court has repeatedly stated

that failure to designate all of the pertinent record will result
in a presumption that the evidence at trial was sufficient to
support the verdict.

James Manufacturing Company v. Wilson, 15

U.2d 210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo,
17 U.2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 (1965); Bennett Leasing Company v.
Ellison, 15 U.2d 72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963).
in other jurisdictions follow this rule.
and Error, §526.

The majority of courts
4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal

The appellants, by failing to designate all of

the necessary and pertinent parts of the record, cannot sustain
the burden of showing that the trial court erred in its findings
and judgment.

As a result, this court properly presumed the

trial court's finding to be supported by competent, admissible
evidence, and the trial court's judgment was properly affirmed.
Finally, in Point V of petitioners' brief, they claim as a
basis for rehearing, a right to have a written response to each
of their contentions.

As explained above, the Court considered

all of the appellants' arguments, affirmed and adopted the trial
court's findings, and wrote its decision based thereon.

Thus,

the findings of the trial court became the findings of the appelDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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late court, and became the basis of the Court's written decision.
This is the written answer that appellants are entitled to.

This

Court has written the answer once, and need not do it twice.
In any event, nothing in petitioners1 Point V can be considered "new" or "obvious error" so that a rehearing should result,
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the Court should deny
the Petition for Rehearing.
1

DATED at Provo, Utah, this 2nd day of February, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents
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